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URING this Survey period, the landscape for professional liabil-
ity claims did not change dramatically. The appellate courts did
reverse a few summary ju gm nts in legal mal actice c ses, ut
they continued to be vigilant in requiring plaintiffs to prove every ele-
ment of their claims against their lawyers. At the end of the period, ques-
tions still remain concerning the viability of fiduciary duty claims against
attorneys based on the attorneys' alleged "misrepresentations" and con-
cerning the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate legal malpractice
claims. With regard to claims against health care providers, the courts
spent most of their time addressing outstanding questions related to the
expert report requirements found in Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code. There were quite a few cases involving claims
against officers and directors during this Survey period. The defendant
officers and directors won some and lost some, with the courts addressing
issues such as personal jurisdiction over out-of-state directors, derivative
claims by the shareholders, and officers' and directors' personal liability
for corporate debts.
I. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. TEXAS COURTS DELIVER MIXED MESSAGES ON
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS
During this Survey period, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in
Houston became one of the few courts in recent years to allow a separate
claim for breach of fiduciary duty to proceed against law firm defendants'
and, in doing so, raised questions about the viability of a fiduciary duty
claim based on alleged "misrepresentations" by an attorney. In Trous-
dale v. Henry,2 the appellate court reversed summary judgment on behalf
of the defendant lawyers on plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant lawyers were negligent in their han-
dling of two lawsuits filed in Liberty County, Texas, both of which were
dismissed for want of prosecution. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment on several grounds, including that plaintiff's claim for breach of fi-
duciary duty constituted an impermissible fracturing of her legal
malpractice claims (which were barred by limitations).
On appeal, the court acknowledged that a malpractice plaintiff cannot
transform a claim that sounds only in negligence into other claims. It also
noted, however, that attorneys "may also be held liable for a breach of
fiduciary duty, but such a claim requires allegations of self-dealing, de-
ception, or misrepresentations that go beyond the mere negligence alle-
gations in a malpractice action."'3 The court explained: "[i]f the gist of a
client's complaint is that the attorney did not exercise that degree of care,
1. See our prior Survey article, Kelli M. Hinson et al., Professional Liability, 61 SMU
L. REv. 1047, 1055 (2008).
2. 261 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. filed).
3. Id. at 227.
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skill, or diligence as attorneys of ordinary skill and knowledge commonly
possess, then that complaint should be pursued as a negligence claim,
rather than some other claim."'4 The court then held that the client's alle-
gations that the attorneys misrepresented the status of her case, failed to
disclose the dismissal of her claims, continued to bill and collect fees from
her, and refused to return her file constituted allegations of deception
and misrepresentation that could be separately pursued.
5
Just a few weeks after issuing the Trousdale opinion, the Fourteenth
Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Duerr v. Brown,6 in which it af-
firmed a summary judgment in favor of the lawyer defendants and con-
firmed that a malpractice plaintiff cannot manufacture a fiduciary duty
claim simply by characterizing the lawyers' conduct as "misrepresenta-
tions."'7 In Duerr, the plaintiff claimed that the lawyer defendants were
negligent in failing to obtain the maximum amount of class settlement
proceeds for him and that they breached their fiduciary duties in inducing
him to rejoin the class settlement by promising him a larger recovery than
he actually received. The court held that this claim was an impermissible
fracturing of plaintiff's malpractice claim.8 Plaintiff also alleged that the
lawyer defendants had a conflict of interest, which they failed to disclose,
because they used him as leverage during the class settlement to obtain
larger recoveries for their other clients. The court rejected this claim be-
cause plaintiff failed to show he was damaged by any alleged conflict of
interest distinct from his alleged malpractice damages and the claim was,
therefore, "merely an alternative label for [plaintiff's] underlying legal
malpractice complaint about receiving less money than he was
promised."9
The Eastland Court of Appeals also examined issues related to fiduci-
ary duty claims against lawyers in Swank v. Cunningham.10 That case
involved (among many other issues) the appeal of a summary judgment
in favor of two defendant law firms arising out of the allegedly inappro-
priate distribution of settlement proceeds obtained in a prior lawsuit. In
the prior lawsuit, Automated Marine Propulsion Systems, Inc. (AMPS)
and its founder, Sverdlin, sued several parties, including AMPS's counsel
Gardere Wynne. Sverdlin eventually settled the claims against Gardere
4. Id.
5. Id. at 227-28.
6. 262 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
7. See also West v. Hubble, No. 05-06-01683-CV, 2008 WL 2941854, at *1, *3 (Tex.
App.-Dallas Aug. 1, 2008, pet. filed) (alleging that attorneys that misrepresented them-
selves as a partnership and misrepresented that they had timely designated experts was not
a fiduciary duty claim); Kimleco Petroleum, Inc. v. Morrison & Shelton, 91 S.W.3d 921, 924
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (alleging that attorney that misled clients about
readiness for trial was not a fiduciary duty claim).
8. Duerr, 262 S.W.3d at 74-75.
9. Id. at 75; see also Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007,
pet. denied) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant attorneys on grounds that
purported fiduciary duty and fraud claims were claims for legal malpractice and were,
therefore, barred by limitations).
10. 258 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, pet. denied).
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Wynne for $20 million, and after a fairness hearing, the court allowed
Gardere Wynne to pay that money directly to Sverdlin rather than to
AMPS." Plaintiffs in the Swank case, Swank and McCoy, claimed to be
shareholders in AMPS and complained about their counsel's failure to
ensure that AMPS (and consequently they) received a portion of the set-
tlement proceeds. The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs
lacked standing to pursue those claims, which belonged to AMPS, and (2)
the law firm defendants had represented the plaintiffs individually and
were, therefore, never in privity with AMPS. 12
The Swank court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of the law
firm defendants on the grounds that plaintiffs' damages theory was "fa-
tally speculative.' 3 The court discussed the requirement of proving dam-
ages in a legal malpractice case and reiterated that damages "cannot be
established by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. ' 14 Plaintiffs relied
on the affidavit of their expert witness, who opined that the law firm de-
fendants should have objected to the apportionment of the settlement at
the fairness hearing and, if they would have objected, "the disbursement
of the $20,000,000.00 settlement funds directly to Sverdlin individually
would have been stopped and AMPS'[s] and McCoy's and Swank's rights
with respect to the settlement funds would have been preserved.' 5 The
court held that the expert's affidavit failed to raise a fact issue on causa-
tion and damages because the expert failed to provide any factual support
for his conclusions, and they were, therefore, "mere speculation and con-
clusory."'1 6 The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs were not required
to prove actual damages in order to obtain disgorgement of fees for the
attorneys' alleged breach of fiduciary duty, but still affirmed summary
judgment on that claim. First, the court noted that the purported breach
of fiduciary duty claims constituted an impermissible fracturing of plain-
tiffs' legal malpractice claims. 17 More importantly, however, the court
held that because the legal fees were paid by third parties (and not Swank
and McCoy), allowing Swank and McCoy to recover those fees as a fee
forfeiture "would result in a windfall to them" and was not an appropri-
ate remedy. 8
B. ACCIDENTAL CREATION OF A DUTY
During the Survey period, the El Paso Court of Appeals dealt with an
interesting issue regarding the "duty" or "privity" requirement for bring-
ing a legal malpractice claim. The plaintiff in Sotelo v. Stewart sued
11. Id. at 653-55.
12. Id. at 663-67.
13. Id. at 672.
14. Id. at 667.
15. Id. at 671.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 656 n.2.
18. Id. at 673.
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Gordon Stewart, the attorney who represented her husband as the defen-
dant in a breach of contract action.19 The malpractice plaintiff, Mrs.
Sotelo, was never sued or served as a defendant in the contract action,
and was never named in the proceedings until attorney Stewart (appar-
ently mistakenly) added her name to the style of a motion for continu-
ance. Nevertheless, judgment was entered against both Mr. and Mrs.
Sotelo in the contract action, and the contract plaintiff obtained a writ of
execution against Mrs. Sotelo's real property. Mrs. Sotelo then sued
Stewart alleging he committed legal malpractice because, despite the lack
of allegations against her, he made her a defendant in the breach of con-
tract case. 20 Stewart obtained a summary judgment against Mrs. Sotelo
in the malpractice action on the ground that he was never Mrs. Sotelo's
attorney and, therefore, owed her no duty of care.21 The court of appeals
reversed. It noted that an attorney-client relationship generally is created
by contract, but it can be implied by the parties' conduct, including the
"gratuitous rendition of professional services."'2 2 Therefore, even though
Mrs. Sotelo testified that she never spoke to or hired Stewart and never
authorized him to take any legal actions on her behalf, Stewart's actions
in adding Mrs. Sotelo's name to the motion for continuance raised a fact
issue as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed, and summary
judgment was, therefore, inappropriate. 2 3
C. PROOF OF CAUSATION
In Grider v. Mike O'Brien, P.C., the First District Court of Appeals in
Houston considered the application of the "suit-within-a-suit" require-
ment for proving causation in an appellate malpractice case. 24 The client
in that case filed suit against her attorneys for failing to perfect an appeal
from an adverse judgment in the client's medical malpractice case. In the
underlying medical malpractice case, the trial court entered a take-noth-
ing judgment against Grider. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals re-
versed and rendered for Grider with regard to the physician's liability and
remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages. The physician filed a
petition for review, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals's judgment and, because her notice of appeal was untimely, dis-
missed Grider's appeal for want of jurisdiction.2 5
The trial court granted summary judgment in the legal malpractice case
on the grounds that Grider could not prove that the law firm's alleged
failure to perfect an appeal caused her any damages. 26 In a legal mal-
practice case, the plaintiff must prove a "suit-within-a-suit," that is that
19. 281 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, pet. denied).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 78.
22. Id. at 80-81.
23. Id.
24. 260 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 54.
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she would have prevailed on the underlying action in the absence of the
attorneys' negligence. 27 The court of appeals noted in Grider that causa-
tion is generally a question of fact for the jury, but held that in cases of
appellate malpractice, "the determination of causation requires determin-
ing whether the appeal in the underlying action would have been success-
ful."'28 Because this inquiry "depends on an analysis of the law and the
procedure rules ... a judge is clearly in a better position to do this than is
a jury."'2 9 The court then held that in cases of appellate malpractice, the
issue of causation is a question of law for the court.30 The court reviewed
the entire record and concluded that Grider would not have prevailed on
appeal and, therefore, the trial court was correct in granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant law firms.31
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston reversed a sum-
mary judgment that was granted based on the plaintiff's alleged failure to
prove her "suit-within-a-suit." In Grimes v. Reynolds,32 the plaintiff filed
suit against her former attorneys alleging that they failed to respond to
requests for admissions and a motion for summary judgment in her un-
derlying federal sexual harassment case. The federal court had granted
summary judgment against her on the sexual harassment claims based, in
large part, on the deemed admissions. In the malpractice lawsuit, the de-
fendant attorneys admitted they had breached the duty of care owed to
the plaintiff, but argued they were entitled to summary judgment because
she could not prove any damages in the underlying suit.33 The trial court
agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant attor-
neys. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston, however, disagreed,
holding that defendants had failed to meet their burden to conclusively
prove the plaintiff would not have recovered any damages in the federal
lawsuit. The defendants relied, in part, on the memorandum opinion of
the federal court granting summary judgment on the plaintiff's sexual
harassment claims, but the court of appeals pointed out that the federal
summary judgment ruling was based on the deemed admissions and the
attorneys' failure to file any summary judgment response. The court held
that the attorneys could not benefit from their own admitted malpractice
by relying on this opinion. 34 The case was thus reversed and remanded. 35
D. SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED BASED ON JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
In Jackson v. Hancock & Canada, LLP,36 the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals considered the effect of a malpractice plaintiff's failure to disclose
27. Id. at 55.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 58-59.
32. 252 S.W.3d 554, 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
33. Id. at 560.
34. Id. at 561.
35. Id.
36. 245 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, pet. denied).
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potential malpractice claims in its bankruptcy schedules. In that case, af-
ter the alleged claims against the defendant attorneys arose, plaintiffs
filed for bankruptcy and failed to include any potential claim against the
attorneys in their schedule of assets. When plaintiffs later brought claims
against the attorneys, the trial court granted summary judgment on the
ground that the plaintiffs were judicially estopped from bringing any un-
scheduled claims, and the court of appeals affirmed.37 Because the case
involved the effect of statements made in a bankruptcy proceeding, the
court applied federal judicial estoppel law in order "to promote the goal
of uniformity and predictability in bankruptcy proceedings. ' 38
"Under federal law, a party which has assumed one position in its
pleadings may be estopped from asserting a contrary position in a subse-
quent proceeding if: (1) the positions are clearly inconsistent, (2) the
court in the prior proceeding accepted the position, and (3) the prior po-
sition was asserted intentionally rather than inadvertently. '39 The court
noted that debtors in bankruptcy have the duty to report any assets they
may have, including any potential causes of action against third parties.
Federal courts have held that the omission of potential claims from a
party's bankruptcy schedule "is tantamount to a representation that no
such claims existed" and is, therefore, inconsistent with the later assertion
of a claim.40 The court also held that even though the bankruptcy was
dismissed and the plaintiffs did not get the benefit of a discharge in bank-
ruptcy, the inconsistent statement was nevertheless "accepted" by the
bankruptcy court.41 The court concluded that "the only reasonable infer-
ence that may be drawn from the bankruptcy court's dismissal due to a
lack of means with which to effectuate a reorganization is that the court
accepted the Jacksons' schedules, which omitted their claim for $323,050
in actual damages against H&C.'' 42 The court also held that the Jacksons
clearly had knowledge of their potential claim during the bankruptcy and,
thus, their failure to schedule it could not be inadvertent.43 Because all
the elements of judicial estoppel were met, summary judgment was
affirmed.44
E. COURTS REMAIN SPLIT REGARDING MANDATORY ARBITRATION
OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
In Bennett v. Leas,45 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals revisited the
question of whether a legal malpractice claim constitutes a claim for "per-
sonal injury" such that any agreement to arbitrate is subject to the height-
37. Id. at 54.
38. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2004)).
41. Id. at 56.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 56-57.
44. Id.




ened procedural requirements of the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA).46
The court had previously held in In re Godt that a legal malpractice claim
is a claim for personal injury under the statute.47 Since that time, how-
ever, at least three other courts of appeal have disagreed and have criti-
cized the holding in Godt.48 Nevertheless, in the absence of "guidance
from the supreme court on this issue," the court declined to overrule its
prior holding and concluded that the trial court had not erred in finding
that the plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice was a claim for personal
injury.4 9 A claim for personal injury is not subject to arbitration under
the TAA "unless each party to a claim, on the advice of counsel, agrees to
arbitrate in writing, and the agreement is signed by each party and each
party's attorney. '50 In Bennett, the client was not advised to consult an
attorney before signing the agreement, nor independently represented
when signing the agreement, and the attorney was, therefore, not entitled
to arbitrate the malpractice claims. 51
In Godt, the court had suggested that an attorney may violate the state
ethics rules by entering into an agreement with a client to arbitrate any
future legal malpractice claims. 52 This theory was not discussed in Ben-
nett, but the Professional Ethics Committee for the State Bar of Texas
issued an ethics opinion in October 2008 concluding that such agreements
are permitted under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Con-
duct. 53 Disciplinary Rule 1.08(g) prohibits a lawyer from prospectively
agreeing with a client to limit the lawyer's malpractice liability unless the
client is represented by independent counsel with respect to the agree-
ment. 54 But the committee found that an arbitration provision does not
limit the malpractice liability of the attorney, it merely establishes the
forum in which such potential liability will be determined.55 The commit-
tee cautioned, however, that the agreement must be carefully drafted so
as not to include terms that are clearly unfair to the client or that "shield
the lawyer from liability to which the lawyer would otherwise be ex-
posed."'56 The committee also concluded that, in order for an arbitration
agreement to be effective, the attorney must advise the client about the
differences between arbitration and litigation so that the "client [can]
make an informed decision about whether to agree to binding arbitra-
tion," acknowledging that the "scope of the explanation will depend on
46. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.002(c) (Vernon 2005).
47. 28 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding).
48. See Taylor v. Wilson, 180 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,
pet. denied); Miller v. Brewer, 118 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.)
(per curium); In re Hartigan, 107 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig.
proceeding).
49. Bennett, 2008 WL 2525403, at *7-8.
50. Id. at *6.
51. Id.
52. Godt, 28 S.W.3d at 739 n.7.






the sophistication, education and experience of the client."'57 The com-
mittee recognized the current split of authority regarding whether a legal
malpractice claim is a claim for "personal injury," but stated that it was
"beyond the authority of [the] Committee to address questions of sub-
stantive law." 58
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Although Texas law has long required plaintiffs in a health care liability
action to provide the defendants they sue with expert reports at an early
stage in litigation, changes to the law in 200359 and 200560 sent many liti-
gants to the courts for clarifications. The statutory changes have been
covered in prior Survey articles and will not receive detailed treatment
here. The cases involving challenges to late or deficient expert reports,
however, dominated the medical malpractice jurisprudence this Survey
period and deserve a closer look since these issues have now worked their
way up the appellate ladder.
A. CHALLENGES TO INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, if a
plaintiff in a health care liability action fails to timely serve an expert
report, a trial court shall grant a defendant's motion to dismiss the case
with prejudice.61 If, however, an expert report is served, but is deficient,
the court has discretion to grant the plaintiff one thirty-day extension to
cure the deficiency.62 Since the 2003 legislative amendments, a defendant
may immediately appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss, but may not
appeal the grant of a thirty-day extension to cure a deficient report. 63 In
Ogletree v. Matthews, a case decided just outside the last Survey period
but mentioned in the last Survey, the Texas Supreme Court determined
that when a trial court simultaneously denies a defendant's motion to dis-
miss and grants the plaintiff a thirty-day extension to cure defects, the
two actions are "inseparable," such that a defendant loses the right to
immediately appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. 64
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.01, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847,
864 (amended 2005) (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001-
.507 (Vernon Supp. 2005)).
60. See Act of May 18, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 635, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1590,
1590 (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001-.507).
61. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b).
62. Id. § 74.351(c).
63. "A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court ... that ...
denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b), except that an
appeal may not be taken from an order granting an extension under 74.351." Id.
§ 51.014(a)(9).
64. 262 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2007).
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In Badiga v. Lopez,65 a case decided outside the Survey period, but
important to the topic, the Texas Supreme Court qualified its holding in
Ogletree. In Badiga, the supreme court explained that a defendant may
seek interlocutory appeal of a trial court's simultaneous denial of its mo-
tion to dismiss and grant of a 30-day extension to file an expert report if
the report was never timely served in the first place.66 In this case, the
plaintiff alleged that Dr. Badiga had negligently perforated her colon dur-
ing a colonoscopy, but she failed to serve Dr. Badiga with an expert re-
port within 120 days of filing her suit, which would have been February
23, 2004.67 When Dr. Badiga moved to dismiss the case on these grounds,
the plaintiff moved for an extension of time to serve the report. 68 On
May 18, 2004, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion, extending the
deadline to file her report to June 18, but did not rule on Dr. Badiga's
motion to dismiss.69 After the plaintiff served Dr. Badiga with her expert
report, Dr. Badiga again moved to dismiss, incorporating his first motion,
and also challenging the sufficiency of the newly served expert's report. 70
On August 10, 2004, the trial court denied Dr. Badiga's motion.71 Dr.
Badiga sought interlocutory review, but the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The supreme court granted
review. 72
The supreme court distinguished this case from Ogletree by noting that
the extension granted in Badiga was not to cure a timely filed but defi-
cient report. Rather, the extension here was granted for a report that was
never filed, an action that is not permitted by the statute. 73 The supreme
court explained that, unlike the pre-2003 statute, which required the grant
of a 30-day extension when the failure to file a conforming report was due
to accident or mistake, the 2003 amendments created a "statute-of-limita-
tions-type deadline within which expert reports must be served. '74 The
court stated that, because the legislature refused trial courts' discretion to
deny motions to dismiss, or to grant extensions when no report is timely
served, a trial court's refusal to dismiss under such circumstances may be
immediately appealed.75
The Texas Supreme Court also made interlocutory review easier for
cases filed under the pre-2003 version of the statute, which did not permit
defendants to appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss.76 In In re McAl-
len Medical Center, the supreme court held that, under the right circum-
65. 274 S.W.3d 681, 684-85 (Tex. 2009).
66. Id. at 682-83.






73. Id. at 683.
74. Id. at 683-84.
75. Id.
76. See In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 466-67 (Tex. 2008).
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stances, when a court's denial of a motion to dismiss amounts to an abuse
of discretion, a defendant may seek immediate mandamus relief.77 In
McAllen, some 400 plaintiffs representing 224 former patients sued
McAllen Medical Center and a surgeon who practiced at the hospital al-
leging that the surgeon was unqualified to perform thoracic surgery and
that the hospital negligently credentialed the surgeon to practice there. 78
Plaintiffs timely filed expert reports, all of which were signed by one ex-
pert.79 The hospital argued that the reports were deficient, in part, be-
cause the expert was not qualified to opine on the claims involved, and it
moved to dismiss.80 The trial court did not rule on the hospital's motion
for four years, and eventually denied it."' The Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals denied the hospital's petition for writ of mandamus, and the
Texas Supreme Court granted review.82
The supreme court called the trial court's denial of the hospital's mo-
tion to dismiss a "clear abuse of discretion," finding that the expert re-
ports were inadequate.83 The supreme court determined that the expert,
who had twenty years of experience as a solo practitioner but no privi-
leges at a hospital, was unqualified to address the issue of negligent
credentialing or the specialized standard of care for hospital credential-
ing.84 Noting that the statutory requirements for early expert reports
were intended to preclude extensive discovery and prolonged litigation in
frivolous cases, the supreme court stated this was precisely the kind of
case the legislature had in mind when it enacted the expert report re-
quirements.8 5 With a critical tone, the court pointed out that this case
involved the consolidated claims of 224 separate patients with nothing in
common besides their treatment by the defendant doctor, and that in the
years the hospital waited for the trial court to rule on its objections to the
deficient expert reports its attorneys had to attend numerous docket calls
and status conferences and had to prepare summary judgment motions to
resolve the claims of 200 additional plaintiffs whose claims were barred
by the statute of limitations. 86 Under such circumstances, the supreme
court held the hospital had no adequate remedy by appeal when its mo-
tion to dismiss was eventually denied. Accordingly, the supreme court
held that mandamus relief is available "when the purposes of the health
care statutes would otherwise be defeated. 8 7
The supreme court acknowledged that in past years it had denied man-
damus petitions involving challenges to the adequacy of expert reports
77. Id. at 463.
78. Id. at 462-63.




83. Id. at 463.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 467-69.
86. Id. at 467.
87. Id. at 462.
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under the pre-2003 statute.88 It also acknowledged that it has no bright-
line test for determining when an appeal is inadequate and a mandamus
petition appropriate. 89 The court explained that the adequacy of appeal
depends on the facts involved in each case, and it endorsed the balancing
test it set forth in In re Prudential Insurance Company of America.9° In
the context of a health care liability claim, the supreme court suggested
that mandamus is appropriate "[i]f (as appears to be the case here) some
trial courts are either confused by or simply opposed to the Legislature's
requirement for early expert reports." 91
Notably, the supreme court also held that the plaintiffs in this case
were not entitled to a 30-day extension to cure the deficient reports. 92
Under the pre-2003 version of the statute applicable to this case, a court
had to grant a thirty-day "grace period" if the inadequacy was the result
of an accident or mistake.93 The current statute gives the courts discre-
tion with regard to whether or not to grant a thirty-day extension.94 The
supreme court held that omission of a necessary element is not an acci-
dent or mistake, and that the plaintiffs' attorneys in this case should have
known that their solo-practitioner expert, who had no staff privileges at
any hospital, was unqualified in hospital credentialing. 95
In In re Methodist Health Care System, 96 the supreme court decided
without oral argument and in the wake of its decision in McAllen, to reit-
erate its position that mandamus may be appropriate in pre-2003 cases
where interlocutory appeal is not available. On the same day in another
case it decided without oral argument, In re Roberts,97 the supreme court
held that mandamus is not appropriate to challenge the grant of a 30-day
extension to cure deficient reports. The court explained that "[bjecause a
30-day extension-even if unjustified-does not substantially prolong liti-
gation or allow for extensive discovery," the benefits to mandamus re-
view are outweighed by the detriments. 98
88. Id. at 461.
89. Id. at 468-69.
90. Id. (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004)).
91. Id. at 466.
92. Id. at 469-70.
93. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(g) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (re-
pealed 2003): "[I]f a claimant has failed to comply with a deadline established by Subsec-
tion (d) of this section and after hearing the court finds that the failure of the claimant or
the claimant's attorney was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but was
the result of an accident or mistake, the court shall grant a grace period of 30 days to
permit the claimant to comply with that subsection."
94. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(c) (Vernon 2008): "If an expert
report has not been served within the period specified by Subsection (a) because elements
of the report are found deficient, the court may grant one 30-day extension to the claimant
in order to cure the deficiency."
95. McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 469-70.
96. 256 S.W.3d 263, 264 (Tex. 2008).




B. CURING DEFICIENT EXPERT REPORTS
In a pair of related decisions issued on the same day, the Texas Su-
preme Court held that a plaintiff may cure a deficient expert report by
serving a report from a different expert. 99 In Lewis v. Funderburk, the
primary issue addressed by the court was a defendant's right to interlocu-
tory appeal when the expert report was timely filed but allegedly inade-
quate.100 The supreme court noted that, under the statute, a report "has
not been served" if it is so deficient that it fails to meet the statutory
requirements.' 01 Therefore, the court held that an order denying a defen-
dant's motion to dismiss based on the insufficiency of a timely filed report
may be immediately appealed under the statute. 102 As to the merits of
the defendant doctor's motion to dismiss, however, the supreme court
rejected the doctor's argument that a plaintiff may only cure deficiencies
with amendments by the original expert. 103 The court reasoned that, be-
cause the statute provides that "a claimant may satisfy any requirement of
this section ... by serving reports of separate experts ... the statute does
not prohibit [a plaintiff] from changing experts midstream. ' 104 Citing this
analysis, the supreme court similarly decided Danos v. Rittger, holding
that the statute allows a plaintiff to cure a deficiency by serving a report
from a separate expert.105
C. APPLICABILITY OF CHAPTER 74
A few cases of note during this Survey period examined the applicabil-
ity of Chapter 74 to claims atypical of standard medical malpractice
claims. In a case of first impression for the Dallas Court of Appeals, the
court considered whether a non-patient's negligence claim against a hos-
pital constituted a health care liability claim subject to the expert report
requirements of Chapter 74.106 In Ammons, Ammons had accompanied
her husband to the defendant hospital's emergency department, and
while there, she suffered injuries caused by another patient at the hospi-
tal.'0 7 The other patient was a male psychiatric patient who had been
placed in a room at the emergency department to await a medical trans-
fer.108 The hospital had placed a security guard outside the room of the
psychiatric patient, but did not otherwise restrain the patient.10 9 At some
99. See Lewis v. Funderburk, 253 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. 2008); Danos v. Rittger, 253
S.W.3d 215, 215 (Tex. 2008).
100. Funderburk, 253 S.W.3d at 207.
101. Id. at 207-08.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 208.
104. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(i) (Vernon 2005)).
105. 253 S.W.3d 215, 215 (Tex. 2008). The court again applied this holding in a manda-
mus proceeding. In re Buster, 275 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. 2008).
106. Wilson N. Jones Mem'l Hosp. v. Ammons, 266 S.W.3d 51, 53 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2008, pet. filed).
107. Id. at 53-54.
108. Id. at 53.
109. Id. at 54.
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point the psychiatric patient rushed the security guard in the hallway, and
as Ammons turned the corner into that hallway, the patient "donkey-
kicked" Ammons in the stomach, knocking her to the floor.110 Ammons
subsequently sued the hospital for negligence, couching her suit as an un-
safe premises action. 1' Specifically, her petition stated that the hospital
failed to keep the common areas of its premises in a reasonably safe con-
dition for its invitees and failed to warn or protect such invitees from
dangers it knew or should have known about in the exercise of ordinary
care."12 Her petition alleged that the psychiatric patient who kicked her
had been admitted to the hospital fifteen times in the previous five years,
and had a documented history of violent and irrational behavior, causing
the hospital to restrain and sedate him on at least one prior occasion." 13
Initially, the hospital filed a no-evidence motion for summary judg-
ment, which was denied." 4 It then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
file an expert report because Ammons never served the hospital with any
expert reports related to her claims."15 After hearing, the trial court
granted the hospital's motion "as to any health care liability claims as-
serted by Plaintiff," but denied the motion "as to Plaintiff's claims for
negligence." 1 6 The hospital filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that all
of Ammons's allegations constituted heath care liability claims for which
an expert report is required. 117
On appeal, Ammons argued that the hospital had waived its right to
seek dismissal by not asserting that "defense" in a timely matter. 118 Al-
ternatively, Ammons argued that her case had nothing to do with the
hospital's rendition of health care services to her or to her assailant, and
therefore was not subject to Chapter 74's requirements for health care
liability claims. 1 9 The court of appeals disagreed on both counts.
120
Concluding that Ammons' claims were health care liability claims gov-
erned by Chapter 74, the court of appeals held it was an abuse of discre-
tion for the trial court to deny the hospital's motion to dismiss.' 2' In
reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals first pointed out that a court
looks to the nature and essence of a claim, rather than the way it is pled,
in order to determine whether it is a health care liability claim.122 In this
case, the court of appeals reasoned that because the hospital's decision as







116. Id. at 55.
117. Id. at 54-55.
118. Id. at 59.
119. Id. at 59-60.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 53.




sion, Ammons's negligence claim was inextricably interwoven with the
rendition of health care services, making her claim a health care liability
claim subject to the requirements of Chapter 74.123 The court reasoned
that the claims in this case were similar to those considered by the Texas
Supreme Court in Diversicare,124 which held that the claims of a nursing
home patient sexually assaulted by another nursing home patient at the
facility constituted health care liability claims because the supervision of
the plaintiff and her assailant were inseparable from the accepted stan-
dards of safety applicable to the nursing-home defendant.
Additionally, the court of appeals determined that the requirements of
Chapter 74 applied to Ammons, even though she was not a patient of the
defendant hospital, because she was a "claimant" under the statute. 125
The court pointed out that the predecessor statute defined a health care
liability claim as one arising from the injury or death "of the patient,"
while the current statute defines a health care liability claim as one aris-
ing from the injury or death "of a claimant.'1 26 The court also noted that
the statute defines "claimant" as including a decedent's estate, rather
than merely a patient's estate, and thus, a claimant may or may not re-
present the estate of a decedent who may or may not have been a pa-
tient. 12 7 Accordingly, the court concluded, based on the plain and
common meaning of the words used in Chapter 74, that a "patient" and
"claimant" do not necessarily refer to the same category of persons, and a
non-patient such as Ammons could constitute a "claimant" as defined by
the statute. 128
Finally, the court rejected Ammons's argument that the hospital had
waived its right to dismissal pursuant to section 74.351 because it had not
timely asserted that "defense."'1 2 9 The court held that the trial court, by
granting the hospital's motion to dismiss as to any health care liability
claims, had implicitly ruled against Ammons on such an argument. 130
The court of appeals did not address the hospital's argument that the re-
quirements of Chapter 74 are not an affirmative "defense" that must be
timely asserted in a pleading. 131
In Parker v. Simmons, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a den-
tal patient's breach of contract and deceptive trade practices claims for
ill-fitting dentures also constituted a health care liability claim, subject to
123. Id. at 64.
124. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d at 845.
125. Ammons, 266 S.W.3d at 60.
126. Id. (citing Act of May 30, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, § 1.03(a)(4), 1977 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2039, 2041 (former TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (Vernon
Supp. 2003)), repealed and codified as amended by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch.
204, §§ 10.01, 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 864, 884, (current version at TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (Vernon 2008)).
127. Id. at 61.
128. Id. at 62.
129. Id. at 57.
130. Id. at 58-59.
131. Id. at 59.
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the requirements of Chapter 74.132 Plaintiff Simmons alleged Dr. Parker
made false claims and promises about the fit and suitability of "snap-on"
dentures.133 Simmons alleged that Parker induced her into entering into
a transaction for ill-fitting dentures that rubbed and gouged her perio-
dontal area, thereby causing her injury, and he subsequently refused to
refund her money. 134 Simmons did not serve an expert report on Parker
and contended she did not need to because her action was not a health
care liability claim. 135 The court of appeals disagreed. Citing Diversicare,
the court stated that a claimant cannot recast a health care liability claim
as another cause of action and thereby avoid the requirements applicable
to such claims. 136 In this case, the appellate court held that the conduct
Simmons complained of-Parker's failure to provide a better denture or
to properly fit the dentures, as promised-are acts "inextricably inter-
twined with the rendition of health care services."'1 37 The court noted
that "[tlhe necessity of expert testimony from a health care professional
to prove a claim [is] an important factor in determining whether [that
claim] is an inseparable part of the rendition of medical or health care
services."'1 38 In this case, the court held such expert testimony was neces-
sary because the complaint focused on the quality of the doctor's
treatment. 13
9
The Texarkana Court of Appeals reached a different decision in
Omaha Healthcare Center, L.L.C. v. Johnson,140 in which a nursing home
resident died as a result of a spider bite suffered while at the defendant's
facility. The court of appeals held that the plaintiff's claims in this case
were premises liability claims involving a duty of ordinary care, as op-
posed to a health care liability claim involving a medical standard of
care. 141 The court distinguished this case from Diversicare, noting that
Diversicare involved medical decisions about the restraint of nursing-
home residents based on medical necessity, whereas this case involved
pest-control judgments that do not implicate the medical duty to diagnose
and treat.142 Accordingly, the court held that Johnson had presented "a
premises liability claim in a health care setting that may not be properly
classified as a health care liability claim" since no medical expert report is
required to explain the standard of care or its breach. 43
132. 248 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 863.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 864.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 246 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. filed).
141. Id. at 286-87.
142. Id. at 285-87.
143. Id. at 287.
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III. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
A. TEXAS COURTS EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Several Texas courts addressed jurisdiction over directors and officers
during this Survey period. In Kelly v. General Interior Construction, Inc.,
the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston analyzed specific personal
jurisdiction over Arizona resident officers and directors of an Arizona-
based construction company named Diva Consulting, Inc. 144 A Texas
subcontractor sued the Diva officers for breach of contract, Texas Trust
Fund Act violations, and fraud. After the trial court denied the officers'
special appearance, they appealed asserting that their actions, including
signing a contract and withholding funds paid by the owner, were solely
in their corporate capacity and could not, therefore, give rise to personal
jurisdiction. The appellate court agreed as to the breach of contract
claim, finding that "a corporate officer who signs a contract on behalf of
his corporation is not a party to the contract, but acting in his corporate
capacity. Such act does not constitute a contact for purposes of personal
jurisdiction.' 45
The officers did not fare as well in connection with the trust fund and
fraud claims. Chapter 162 of the Texas Property Code imposes fiduciary
responsibilities on contractors to ensure that Texas subcontractors are
paid for completed work.146 An officer or director who has control over
such funds is personally liable for misappropriating those funds.147 Be-
cause the subcontractor in this case asserted individual claims under the
Texas Trust Fund Act, the court of appeals found that personal jurisdic-
tion existed as to those claims. 148 Similarly, because officers may be indi-
vidually liable for alleged false statements, even if those statements are
made in the capacity of a corporate representative, the court held that
personal jurisdiction existed as to the fraud claims as well.1 4 9
Specific and general jurisdiction via an alter-ego theory was addressed
by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Joiner v. Coast Paper & Sup-
ply.150 In that case, Joiner Food Service, Inc., a Texas corporation, sued a
California corporation, its officer, and a Texas limited partnership. The
plaintiff alleged that, under an alter-ego theory, specific and general juris-
diction existed over the California corporation's officer by virtue of the
partnership's conduct. The court noted that jurisdictional veil-piercing
involves different elements of proof than substantive veil-piercing, and
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer controlled the internal bus-
144. 262 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. granted).
145. Id. at 83 (citing Wolf v. Summers-Wood, L.P., 214 S.W.3d 783, 792 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2007, no pet.)).
146. Id. at 84-85.
147. Id. at 85.
148. Id. at 85-86.
149. Id. at 86-87.
150. No. 13-07-00623-CV, 2008 WL 2895851, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July
29, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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iness operations of the entity "to a degree 'greater than that normally
associated with common ownership and directorship."''l51 Because the
plaintiff focused on intentional undercapitalization as its theory to show
alter ego by perpetuating a fraud, the court found that the plaintiff may
have presented sufficient evidence to pierce the veil substantively but not
for jurisdictional purposes. 152 The court further found that the California
officer had not purposely availed herself of the jurisdiction of Texas
courts because her contacts with the state, including several personal vis-
its, were done in her capacity as an officer of the company.'5 3 The court
further found that the officer had not solicited business in Texas, had
never employed residents of Texas, had not committed a tort in Texas,
had never done business in Texas in her individual capacity, and had not
consented to jurisdiction of Texas courts in her individual capacity. 15 4
The nonresident directors in Glencoe Capital Partners II, L.P. v. Gern-
sbacher15 5 did not have similar success. In that case, the trial court denied
the nonresident directors' special appearance, and the court of appeals
agreed, finding that participation in telephonic board meetings consti-
tuted purposeful availment because the nonresident directors knew that
some directors were Texas residents and that they operated corporate di-
visions in Texas. 156 Consequently, the nonresident directors sought some
benefit and were advantaged by availing themselves of Texas jurisdiction.
Significant in this case was that the principal contacts supporting specific
jurisdiction were telephonic board meetings during which plaintiffs par-
ticipated from Texas and during which the defendants allegedly made
misrepresentations regarding the company's financial condition and
terms for certain notes-the subject matter of the lawsuit. The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Texas Supreme Court has
"disapproved opinions holding that ... specific jurisdiction is necessarily
established by allegations or evidence that a nonresident committed a
tort in a telephone call from a Texas number," but it noted that the Texas
Supreme Court has never "held that telephone calls are never sufficient
to establish [such] minimum contacts.' 5 7 Unique to this case was that
the telephone calls involved multiple telephonic board meetings at regu-
lar intervals over a span of years during which time the plaintiffs allege
that defendants induced them to enter into certain notes after making
alleged misrepresentations. Surprisingly, the appellate court even went a
step further stating that its finding of jurisdiction was not dependent on
the defendants' knowledge that the plaintiffs were participating in the
meetings from Texas because, even in the absence of such knowledge, "it
151. Id. at *6 (citing BMC Software Beig., NV v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 799 (Tex.
2002)).
152. Id. at *7.
153. Id. at *7-8.
154. Id.
155. 269 S.W.3d 157 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
156. Id. at 163, 165, 167.




was foreseeable that their activity directed toward Texas residents would
subject them to Texas jurisdiction."'1 58
B. OFFICERS ACTING IN AN INDIVIDUAL VERSUS
A CORPORATE CAPACITY
A cautionary tale is provided by IMC, Inc. v. Gambulos, in which an
officer signed a personal guaranty and subsequently tried to avoid re-
sponsibility.1 59 In that case, the president of the corporation, Ceramic &
Granite Trading Company, LLC, signed a personal guaranty. After he
was sued for breach of contract, the trial court granted his motion for
summary judgment, finding that he was not personally responsible for the
guaranty because he signed only in his capacity as president of the corpo-
ration.160 The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that "[t]he fact
that a corporate title follows an individual's signature does not transform
a personal guaranty into a corporate guaranty.' 61 The court went on to
describe the signature as a descriptio personae, meaning the use of a word
or phrase to identify the person rather than proof that a person is acting
in any particular capacity. 162
C. RES JUDICATA AND PARALLEL LITIGATION
It is not at all unusual for director and officer liability cases to be
brought in parallel federal and state courts. This type of parallel litigation
frequently raises the issue of res judicata, as addressed in Motient Corp. v.
Dondero.163 In that case, a Delaware corporation, Motient, brought suit
against Dondero, a director on the board, in federal court alleging viola-
tions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act based on alleged false, mislead-
ing, and incomplete public statements. Motient also brought suit against
Dondero in state court alleging breach of fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care and the duty of good faith. Dondero successfully moved to dismiss
the federal suit due to insufficient pleading under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act. Dondero then moved for summary judgment in
the state court case based on the res judicata effect of the federal court
dismissal. Res judicata bars "litigation of claims that either have been
litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit."'1 64 Prior federal
litigation bars a subsequent suit if: (1) the parties are identical in both
suits or in privity, (2) the same claim or cause of action is involved in both
suits, (3) the prior judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, and (4) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the
158. Id. at 166.
159. No. 05-07-00470-CV, 2008 WL 3867429, at *1. (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 21, 2008,
no pet.)
160. Id.
161. Id. at *2.
162. Id.
163. 269 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
164. Id. at 83.
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merits.' 65 The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order
granting summary judgment finding that, although both suits involved the
same claim and cause of action, the federal court was not a court of com-
petent jurisdiction over the fiduciary duty claims because there was no
diversity jurisdiction. 166 Although supplemental jurisdiction existed, it
was clear that the federal court would have declined as a matter of discre-
tion to exercise that jurisdiction because "it was the practice of [that] fed-
eral court judge, the Honorable Jorge Solis, to dismiss pendent state law
claims when all federal claims had been dismissed.' 67 Consequently, the
Dallas Court of Appeals found that the Northern District would not have
exercised supplemental jurisdiction, and therefore res judicata did not
apply.' 68
D. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS AND THE TAX CODE
In In re Trammell, a Dallas appellate court addressed whether an of-
ficer personally liable for corporate debts could enforce an arbitration
clause signed by his company. 169 The case dealt with a claim against Cecil
Trammell, president and shareholder of C & K Concrete (C & K), a com-
pany that had lost its corporate charter. Trammell, who faced liability for
C & K's debts pursuant to section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code, moved
to compel arbitration under a contract signed by the company. After the
trial court denied Trammell's motion, he filed a petition for a writ of man-
damus and an interlocutory appeal, arguing that the trial court's decision
constituted an abuse of discretion. 170
The court affirmed the order denying arbitration and rejected Tram-
mell's petition for a writ of mandamus.171 It concluded that, because the
plaintiffs sought to hold Trammell liable based solely on section 171.255
of the Tax Code, their claims against him did not arise from the contract
containing the arbitration provision. 172 In addition, Trammell could not
rely on equitable estoppel, which applies when a "signatory to a written
agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely on the terms of the
written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory," to en-
force the arbitration clause. 173 In a related dispute with the plaintiffs, C
& K had not appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to compel
arbitration. The court therefore concluded that "Trammell, a non-
signatory, cannot use the principle of equitable estoppel to obtain a
greater right to arbitration than the signatories," and held that forcing
Trammell to litigate the claims against him would not be unfair or
165. Id.
166. Id. at 86.
167. Id. at 88, 90.
168. Id. at 90.
169. 246 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 825.
172. Id.




The Austin Court of Appeals addressed an officer's individual liability
for sales tax in State v. Crawford.17 5 In that case, the State of Texas and
the City of Houston sued the CEO and CFO of a construction company
seeking to establish individual liability under section 111.016(b) of the
Texas Tax Code. The governmental entities alleged that the officers will-
fully failed to pay or cause to be paid delinquent sales tax amounts owed
to the city and the state. Because the evidence was sufficient to establish
that the officers did not knowingly fail to remit collected sales taxes to the
state, and the evidence was sufficient to establish that the officers did not
act with direct disregard of the risk that collected taxes might not be re-
mitted, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment in
favor of the officers. 176
E. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND DEMAND FUTILITY
Demand futility was a hot topic for the Dallas and Houston Courts of
Appeal during this Survey period. In Connolly v. Gasmire, two share-
holders of Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., Connolly and Molinari, brought a
shareholder derivative action against a Delaware corporation's board of
directors and officers. 177 The shareholders alleged that the directors and
officers breached their fiduciary duties in connection with Medicare and
Medicaid billing and, instead of taking action to halt the wrongdoings,
sold more than $60 million of their Odyssey stock. The trial court sus-
tained the directors' and officers' special exceptions, finding that the
shareholders had failed to state the necessary factual allegations to show
demand futility. 178 After the plaintiffs ignored the court order directing
them to amend their petition, the trial court dismissed the case without
prejudice. 179
The appellate court affirmed, first ruling that special exceptions were
the proper method to address plaintiffs' failure to plead demand futil-
ity.18° The court then analyzed demand futility under Delaware substan-
tive law,18' providing detailed analysis as articulated in the two seminal
Delaware cases on that issue-Aronson v. Lewis1 82 and Rales v. Bias-
band.1 83 Under those cases, in order to bring a derivative claim, a share-
holder must plead with particularity facts that raise a reasonable doubt
that a majority of the directors "are disinterested and independent, dem-
onstrating that they are unable to act objectively with respect to a pre-suit
174. Id. at 825-26.
175. 262 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
176. Id. at 535.
177. 257 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
178. Id. at 845-46.
179. Id. at 838.
180. Id.
181. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
182. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
183. 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
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demand.' 84 The court rejected the shareholders' attempt to show lack of
disinterest due to the directors' participation on the compliance, compen-
sation, and audit committees.'85 The court noted that there were no par-
ticularized facts showing that the committees had failed to perform their
duties, and mere participation on those committees alone was insufficient
to show disinterest. 186 The court also ruled that "the mere fact that a
director receives compensation for his services as a board member does
not demonstrate demand futility. ' 187 Additionally, merely alleging that
the directors had sold stock- absent allegations of insider trading, com-
mon trading patterns, or inconsistency in the directors' trading-was not
sufficient to show lack of disinterest.1 88 Similarly, the shareholders' alle-
gations that the directors had longstanding relationships with each other
was not sufficient to show a lack of independence absent something more
serious such as financial ties, familial affinity, or a particularly close, inti-
mate personal or business affinity. a89 Finally, allegations concerning the
directors' experience and expertise and collective involvement and
wrongdoing were not sufficient absent particularized facts detailing the
precise duties and each role the directors played, the information that
would have come to their attention in those roles, and how they benefited
from the alleged wrongdoing.1 90
The court, applying the Aronson test, also found insufficient pleaded
facts to show lack of business judgment by the directors. 91 In attempting
to show lack of business judgment, the shareholders relied on a Seventh
Circuit case and a Massachusetts state case. 192 The shareholders asserted
that knowledge of alleged defects in internal controls and knowledge of
the alleged Medicare and Medicaid violations could be imputed generally
to the directors of the corporation. The court rejected those cases, in-
stead noting that under Delaware law a petition must allege facts that
suggest or imply the directors "knew they were making a material deci-
sion without adequate information and without adequate deliberation,
and they did not care if the decision caused the corporation and stock-
holders to suffer injury or loss. ''193 Finding that the plaintiffs had failed
to plead sufficient facts under any of the tests, the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals held that the trial court did not err in sustaining the directors' and
184. Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 842.
185. Id. at 842-45.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 845.
188. Id. at 845-47.
189. Id. at 847.
190. Id. at 847-49.
191. Id. at 852.
192. Id. at 850-51 (citing cases that shareholders used as authority: In re Abbott Labs
Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Biopure Corp. Deriv-
ative Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308 (D. Mass. 2006)).
193. Id. (citing Khanna v. McMinn, No. Civ. A. 20545-NC, 2006 WL 1388744, at *12,




officers' special exceptions and in ultimately dismissing the case. 194
Whether or not to stay discovery until the demand futility requirement
has been met is a frequent topic of contention. The Fourteenth Court of
Appeals in Houston dealt with this issue in In re Crown Castle Interna-
tional Corp.a95 In that case, various shareholders brought a derivative
action on behalf of a Delaware corporation, Crown Castle, alleging that
officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties by backdating stock
options grants. Crown Castle filed special exceptions stating that the
shareholders had not made demand on the board of directors and had not
alleged particularized facts showing demand futility. Soon after the
shareholders served discovery, the respective parties filed motions to
compel and protective orders. The trial court granted Crown Castle's
special exceptions but overruled its objections to discovery, disagreeing
that the corporation was not obligated to respond to discovery until de-
mand futility had been adequately pleaded. 196 The corporation filed a
writ of mandamus seeking to compel the trial court to stay discovery until
the shareholders adequately pleaded demand futility. The Fourteenth
Court of Appeals treated both the demand futility pleading requirements
and a party's entitlement to discovery as substantive and applied Dela-
ware law, holding that the shareholders could not seek discovery for the
purpose of satisfying the demand futility pleading requirements.1 97 Con-
sequently, the court of appeals conditionally granted the petition for writ
of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the
motion for protective order and refusing to stay all discovery pending an
adequate pleading of demand futility. 198
A former CEO's severance compensation and potential breach of fidu-
ciary duties related to his employment agreement were addressed in
Pride International, Inc. v. Bragg.199 In that case, Bragg, the CEO of
Pride, challenged the severance package provided in the employment
agreement he had negotiated after he was hired. While CEO, Bragg
made representations to the board regarding the severance benefits,
which were contrary to the assertions he made in the lawsuit after he was
terminated. Indeed, during the CEO's tenure, he rejected claims brought
by other officers urging the very interpretation the CEO made in his law-
suit. In response to the CEO's breach of contract claims, the company
alleged breach of fiduciary duty claims against him contending that the
CEO had failed to disclose material information about the company,
namely his understanding of the employment agreement. The trial court
granted summary judgment against both parties and ordered that both
194. Id. at 852.
195. 247 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
196. Id. at 352.
197. Id. at 354 (citing Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1056 (Del. 2004)); see also
Stotland v. GAF Corp., No. 6876, 1983 WL 21371, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1983) ("the
Plaintiffs are not entitled to take discovery in order to prove allegations of futility.").
198. Id. at 356.
199. 259 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
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parties take nothing by their suits. 200
The First Court of Appeals in Houston, applying Delaware law, agreed
with the trial court finding that Bragg's failure to inform the board of his
understanding of the employment agreement did not constitute a failure
to disclose because the information was otherwise available to the com-
pany.20' Significantly, the company had consulted with legal counsel and
was aware of conflicting views of the interpretation of the agreement.
Additionally, Bragg had no duty to disclose his private views as to the
interpretation of his employment agreement when negotiating and re-
newing his own employment. 20 2 The court specifically held that in such a
context, "a corporate officer acts in his individual capacity, as it is evident
that the company and the employee are adverse to each other in the con-
text of negotiating that employee's compensation. '20 3 Consequently, the
court of appeals affirmed the granting of Bragg's summary judgment mo-
tion.204 Of course, this victory was of little benefit to Bragg because the
court of appeals also affirmed the company's summary judgment as to the
breach of contract claims.20 5
F. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
In Elloway v. Pate, a Houston appellate court explored the limitations
of two sections of the Delaware Code, which exculpate directors from
liability in certain circumstances, sections 141(3) and 102(b)(7) of Chap-
ter 8.206 The plaintiff, Elloway, was a Pennzoil-Quaker State Company
shareholder who brought a class action against Pennzoil's directors, alleg-
ing that they had breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the
company's sale to Shell Oil Company. Elloway argued that the directors
agreed to an unfairly low per-share price to ensure that Shell would con-
summate the merger despite additions to the company's change-in-con-
trol benefits. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for a
directed verdict on Elloway's duty of care claim, and the jury rejected
Elloway's duty of disclosure and duty of loyalty claims.20 7
On appeal, Elloway argued that the court erred in granting directed
verdict. In response, the directors relied on a provision in Pennzoil's cer-
tificate of incorporation authorized by section 102(b)(7), which insulated
the directors from liability for breaches of the duty of care. Elloway ar-
gued that the directors did not rely on this provision in the trial court and,
therefore, could not raise this defense for the first time on appeal. Since
the jury had never considered the issue, it had not concluded that the
directors' actions were "in good faith and did not involve intentional mis-
200. Id.
201. Id. at 850.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 851.
205. Id.
206. 238 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
207. Id. at 889.
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conduct or a knowing violation of the law, which are elements of proof
under section 102(b)(7). °2 0 8 But the court held that a jury finding spe-
cific to section 102(b)(7) was unnecessary-the jury's response to its
breach of loyalty question had necessarily decided that the directors' ac-
tions were in good faith.20 9
Elloway also challenged a prefatory jury instruction based on section
141(e), which exculpates board members from liability when they rely in
good faith on corporate records, officers, employees, committees of the
board, or others "as to matters the [member] reasonably believes are
within such other person's professional or expert competence and who
has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corpora-
tion."2 10 Elloway argued that the instruction improperly relieved the di-
rectors of the burden of proving their defense, was inappropriate because
it only applies to duty of care claims, and was unavailable because the
board allegedly was deceived by individuals who would profit from their
misconduct.2 11 The court rejected each contention, noting first that the
relevance of section 141(e) is not limited to duty of care claims.2 1 2 Next,
the court rejected the argument that the board could not rely on any indi-
viduals who stood to benefit from the transaction at issue: "[s]imply be-
cause a director stands to gain financially through change-in-control
benefits does not mean the director has a financial interest in the merger
so that the board may not delegate negotiating authority to that direc-
tor. '2 13 Finally, the court noted that the jury instruction in this case had
included a caveat that "a director may not avoid his or her active and
direct duty of oversight in connection with the merger.2 14 Directors have
a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a decision of all material
information reasonably available to them. ' 21 5 Therefore, the jury was ad-
equately instructed regarding the directors' duties, and there was no
harmful error in the jury instruction.
IV. CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the cases in this Survey period, professional liability
claims against lawyers, health care providers, and corporate officers and
directors all have their own complex procedural and proof requirements.
As in past years, the appellate courts in this period required strict compli-
ance with these requirements and rejected those claims where plaintiffs'
pleadings or proof fell short.
208. Id. at 890.
209. Id. at 890-91.
210. Id. at 896.
211. Id. at 897-98.
212. Id. at 898-99.
213. Id. at 898.
214. Id. at 898-99.
215. Id.
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